IT researchers at the University of Regensburg have on the CCC-27C3 hacker conference in Berlin presented a method how the surfing habits of users of the Tor anonymity service monitor. A solution is not yet in sight. Who has a good reason to hide his movements on the Web before the eyes of potential supervisors should, but use the gateway service - the recommended civil rights groups like the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) for years.But creating the Tor service only relative safety, now IT researchers at the University of Regensburg point to the 27C3 Hacker Congress. Key conclusion of the presentation: Tor does not think as good as before. Although it is still not possible, the surfing behavior of a Tor user to observe one-on-one, but could understand in retrospect it definitely.
And with a relatively simple trick: the supervisor drives like that on the data path beside the monitored persons. Tor, short for "The Onion Router", is a first time in 2002 published program is to make anonymous surfing possible by managing the entire data traffic between the surfer and he visited the site of a complex network of proxy servers.
As with a P2P Exchange Server direct participant of the Tor network-wide data packet, and thus build an alternative route data. Gate can be combined with encryption technology, making it - like JAP - also applies as a suitable tool to elude government censorship. But quite as secure as the user, the hope, Goal is apparently not: With a probability 55-80 percent, reported the Regensburg business information Dominik Herrmann in Berlin, one could understand at least the surfing behavior of a monitored in the Tor network.
You should only send the same network as the monitored out-door inquiries on the way and watch their routing. The comparison of the data packets traveling parallel then placed the open on that date by a certain point in the Tor network outbound routing - and made it so possible hits of a monitored persons assigned to the appropriate web addresses.
Prerequisite for such a monitoring is the "proximity" to the entry point of the monitored persons: feasibility study that would, for example, a network access the same wireless network, or the provider of the monitored nwu, for example, arranged in a police surveillance. This all sounds relatively harmless, but it is by no means: for example, that would be dangerous for someone in China who is on the road to dissident sites, but just for covert intelligence agents, such as for criminal money launderers.
Services such as Tor are used for various purposes. Herrmann said the operator of the Tor service to help to address the problem. Simply, a solution is not to be found. The monitoring of a Tor user by observing his behavior was thought to surf but to be extremely expensive: The vulnerabilities were the entrances and exits of the network.
With a monitoring score as many nodes as possible, or large parts of the Internet at the level of so-called backbones, it would at least theoretically possible, as well as any communications routed through Tor assigned. But that would require far-reaching cooperation or free access to the infrastructure of influential Internet-node network operator, respectively.
The approach presented in Berlin trick appears as significantly more realistic, because less complex. Tor is a secret communication channel, not a P2P replacement until just before Christmas was classified as critical security hole in the gate was closed by software update. On the reliability of gate count, according to the operators in the world at any given time 100000-300000 users, over one tenth of which is based in Germany.
The open source software is for all the possible uses and audiences open, defined in their terms but not required applications, including criminal activities, but also anything that requires broadband connections. Tor is not, for instance, the anonymous routing of multimedia files suitable because the network is much slower than the unprotected way across the Internet.
Reason is the P2P structure of the network: The data relay mentioned proxy node through which traffic is routed to be volunteers paid by the State - in the ideal case, the data then pass through the servers of a university, but it is also about the DSL line of a private user to go. Currently, about 2,000 of these relays are active, with an average data volume of around 150 MB / sec to be ready.
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